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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATUTORY
PROVISION ALLOWING PUBLIC SCHOOLS
TO BE FINANCED PRIMARILY BY LOCAL
PROPERTY TAXES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAWS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The potential success of each individual and of American
society as a whole is based to a large extent upon our system
of public schools, whose administration is controlled by the in-
dividual states. With the abandonment of the "separate but
equal" concept of public schools, the area of financing in the
public school domain remains for consideration in order to in-
sure "equal educational opportunity for all." The concept of
equal educational opportunity is not susceptible of any precise
definition, therefore this comment will attempt to explore re-
cent developments in this area and the effect of these develop-
ments upon our present educational system.
In Serrano v. Priest,' reversing and remanding with di-
rection to overrule the demurrers as to each claim, the Su-
preme Court of California held that the complaint alleged suf-
ficient facts to show that California's system of public school
financing, which relied heavily upon local property taxes in
determining the expenditure per pupil in local districts, was
an unconstitutional denial of "equal protection of the laws"1
2
in that the financing system created a classification based on
wealth which constituted an invidious discrimination against
the poor. In reaching this conclusion the Serrano court held
that education is a fundamental interest,3 and that "this
system [California's] conditions the full entitlement to such
interest on wealth, classifies its recipients on the basis of their
collective affluence and makes the quality of a child's educa-
tion depend upon the resources of his school district and ulti-
mately upon the pocket book of his parents."4
*Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
1. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §1.
3. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 599, 487 P.2d 1241, 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 623 (1971).
4. Id.
1
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II. LEGISLATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS AND
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In rendering this decision, the Serrano court had to de-
termine upon which criteria the classification was to be
judged. Traditionally, legislative classifications were sub-
jected to a "reasonable relationship test" whose principles
were first enunciated in Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas o.5
In the more recent case of McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs the court stated that "statutory classifications will
be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify
them."7
The Serrano court rejected this standard in favor of the
stricter criteria defined as the "compelling governmental in-
terest doctrine"." In order to establish the availability of this
doctrine, the court in Serrano drew upon a line of cases estab-
lishing wealth as a suspect classification. 9 In Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections10 the Supreme Court of the United
States stated, "Lines drawn upon the basis of wealth or prop-
erty, like those of race are traditionally disfavored."'" Even
though no purposeful or intentional discrimination was found
in California's school financing statutes, the court relied upon
5. 220 U.S. 61 (1911). In this case the Supreme Court laid down spe-
cific rules to be used in determining whether statutory guidelines were viola-
tive of equal protection of the laws. Among them were the principles that the
Equal Protection Clause permits legislatures a wide scope of discretion in classi-
fying and adopting police and welfare laws and that the Equal Protection
Clause only forbids that which is done without any reasonable basis and there-
fore that which is purely arbitrary.
6. 394 U.S. 802 (1969). In this case the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois
absentee voting statute which, in providing for absentee ballots to persons who
for medical reasons could not go to the polls or who would be out of the
country, had failed to provide for absentee ballots to inmates in county jails.
7. Id. at 806.
8. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Kramer v. Union
Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
9. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956) ; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
10. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). In this case the Supreme Court invalidated a
Virginia poll tax stating it introduced the irrelevant factor of wealth into de-
termination of the qualifications of the right to vote.
11. Id. at 668.
1972] 465
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two criminal decisions12 placing upon the state the duty of re-
lieving an indigent of the burden of his own poverty.' 3
In order to further support their argument, the Serrano
court asserted that education is a "fundamental interest" stat-
ing, "[W]e are convinced that the distinctive and priceless
function of education in our society warrants, indeed compels,
our treating it as a 'fundamental interest'."'14 Precedent may
be found for this viewpoint in Brown v. Board of Education'5
which invalidated de jure segregation by race in the public
schools. In Brown the Supreme Court stated that "Today, edu-
cation is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments.... Such an opportunity, [education]... is
a right which must be made available to all on equal terms."' '
In all cases prior to Serrano, While wealth had been
established as a suspect classification, it had always been in
conjunction with other fundamental rights such as the right
to vote, the right to a meaningful appeal in a criminal trial and
the right to counsel. Brown did speak of education as a "right
which must be made available to all on equal terms", but it did
so in the area of racial discrimination.
Having determined that wealth was a suspect classifica-
tion and that education was a "fundamental interest", the
court next questioned whether the California school financing
system was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.
The State of California asserted that local administrative con-
trol over education was a compelling state interest,"' and that
"if one district raises a lesser amount per pupil than another
district, this is a matter of choice and preference of the in-
dividual district and reflects the individual desire for lower
taxes rather than an expanded educational program, or may
reflect greater interest within that district in such other ser-
12. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956).
13. Justice Harlan in a dissenting opinion filed in Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) reaffirmed his previous opinion that
Douglas and Griffin should be viewed as based upon fundamental due process
rather than equal protection of the laws.
14. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601, 618 (1971).
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. Id. at 493.
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vices that are supported by local property taxes, as, for exam-
ple, police and fire protection or hospital services."18
The Serrano court dismissed these arguments by stating:
Assuming arguendo that local administrative control may be a com-
pelling state interest, the present financing system cannot be con-
sidered necessary to further this interest. No matter how the state
decides to finance its system of education, it can still leave this deci-
sion-making power in the hands of local districts.1 9
III. PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
In the case of McGowvan v. Maryland,20 the Supreme Court
granted wide discretion to state legislators as to the reason-
ableness of their classifications:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests
on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.
State legislators are presumed to have acted within their constitutional
power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some in-
equality. A statutory' discrimination will not be set aside if any state
of facts may be conceived to justify it.21
Two recent decisions, Burruss v. WilkersoU22 and Mclnnis
v. Shapiro,23 have been considered by the Supreme Court. The
holding of these decisions was that the state and local legisla-
tive patterns for levying and disbursing taxes in the area of
school financing in those two states were not unconstitutional.
The financing of public schools in Virginia and Illinois was
similar to that of California.
The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In this case the Supreme Court upheld a Sunday
closing law because the state legislature could reasonably find that the Sunday
sale of exempted commodities was necessary either for the health of the popu-
lace or the enhancement of the recreational atmosphere of the day and was not
repugnant to equal protection of the laws by virtue of such exemptions.
21. Id. at 425, 426.
22. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd 397
U.S. 44 (1970).
23. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Il. 1968), af'd mere. mtb nom. Mclnnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
1972]
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trict of Illinois rendered the decision of McInnis v. Shapiro24
which was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court. In
McInnis, a three judge court upheld the Illinois state statutory
system of financing education through local property taxation
even though it resilted in wide variations in per pupil ex-
penditures from district to district. The plaintiffs in McInnis
based their argument upon the Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The court considered the claim upon
that ground but stated that the relief sought resembled sub-
stantive due process. 25
In McInnis, the court stated that "Expenses are not...
the exclusive yardstick of a child's educational needs .... The
desirability of a certain degree of local experimentation and
local autonomy in education also indicates the impracticability
of a single simple formula." 26
The Serrano court refused to accept the reasoning in Mc-
Innis, stating that the primary basis for that ruling was that
the plaintiff's claim was based upon "educational needs" as
the proper standard to measure school financing schemes
against the Equal Protection Clause. In Serrano, the court
stated:
[N]onjusticiability of the "educational needs" standard was the basis
for the McInnis holding and the district court's affirmance of the sub-
stantive issues was purely dictum.27
McInnis was also cited with approval in Briggs v.
Kerrigan.28 In Briggs, the District Court of Massachusetts
held that the City of Boston did not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by failing to provide subsidized lunches in all of its
public schools. The lunches were provided only in those schools
24. Id. The Illinois system of finance is substantially similar to Califor-
nia's, The court in McInnis based its decision on the facts that the legislative
classification was neither arbitrary nor creative of an invidious classification
and also that there was a lack of judicially manageable standards for the type
of relief that was sought.
25. Id. at 331&n.11. The court stated, "(Q]uality education for all is
more desirable than uniform, mediocre instruction. Yet if the Constitution only
commands that children be treated equally, the latter result would satisfy the
fourteenth amendment ......
26. Id. at 336.
27. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 605, 487 P.2d 1241, 1265, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601, 624 (1971).
28. 307 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1969), affd 431 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 24
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with kitchen facilities and the result was that some of the more
affluent children received subsidized lunches while poorer
children did completely without. The court in Briggs con-
cluded that this inequality was constitutionally permissible.
Most notably in Briggs, the court stated:
It does not follow that state and federal programs affecting citizens un-
equally are all unconstitutional if some hypothetical appropriation of
funds would produce equal benefits to all citizens.
2 9
In Burruss v. Wilkerson," an action was brought attack-
ing the constitutional validity of Virginia's statute relating
to the distribution of public education funds. The District
Court held that there was no discrimination in the disburse-
ment of funds under Virginia's financing arrangement, and
that the cities and counties received state funds under a uni-
form consistent plan. The court dismissed the action upon
finding that the differences in a particular county were the
result of the inability of the county to obtain locally the
moneys needed to be added to the state contribution. In com-
menting upon the plaintiff's demand for equal educational op-
portunity the court stated:
Actually, -the plaintiffs seek to obtain allocations of state funds among
the cities and counties so that the pupils in each of them will enjoy the
same educational opportunities. This is certainly a worthy aim, com-
mendable beyond measure. However, the courts have neither the knowl-
edge, nor the means, nor the power to tailor the public moneys to fit the
varying needs of these students throughout the State. We can only see
to it that the outlays on one group are not invidiously greater or less
than that of another. No such arbitrariness is manifest here.
3 '
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The case of Rodriquez v. San Antonio Independent School
Distrit,32 decided by a three-judge district court, relied
heavily upon Serrano in holding that the Texas system of pub-
lic school financing was a denial of equal protection of the laws
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Consti-
29. Id. at 304.
30. 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
31. Id. at 574.
32. 40 U.S.L.W. 2398 (U.S. January 4, 1972).
19721
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tution, in that the Texas financing scheme like that of Cali-
fornia relied heavily upon the local property tax base and had
established a classification based on wealth which affected a
"fundamental interest". The court reaffirmed the principle of
"fiscal neutrality" inferred from the decision of the Serrano
court.33 This case is currently upon appeal to the United
States Supreme Court and will presumably provide the Court
with the first opportunity to evaluate the reasoning first ad-
vanced by Serrano.
In Robinson v. Cahill,3 4 the Superior Court of New Jersey
held that the New Jersey system of financing public education,
which relied heavily on local property taxes, denied the plain-
tiff's equal protection rights guaranteed by the New Jersey
and Federal Constitutions. Drawing primarily from the thesis
advanced in Serrano, the New Jersey court stated:
The [financing] system discriminates against pupils in districts with
low real property wealth, and it discriminates against taxpayers by
imposing unequal burdens for a common state purpose.
35
Consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions, the court
admonished that their opinion should not be construed as to
require the legislature to adopt any specific method of fi-
nancing or taxation. Specifically, the court stated:
The Legislature may approach the goal required [a system of thorough
and efficient education] by any method reasonably calculated to ac-
complish that purpose consistent with the equal protection requirements
of the law.
3a
The Robinson court, while declaring the present financing sys-
tem unconstitutional, gave its ruling prospective application
only and allowed the legislature until January 1, 1973, to cor-
rect the discriminatory taxation system while retaining juris-
diction for any modification or further order as may be re-
quired.37
In Van DuSartz v. Hatfield,36 the U.S. District Court in
Minnesota adopted the findings of the Serrano Court in con-
cluding that a system of public school financing which makes
33. Id. at 2399.
34. 118 N.J. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
35. Id. at 253, 287 A,2d at 217.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
[Vol. 24
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spending per pupil a function of the school district's wealth
violates the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court denied the defendant's motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a cause of action and deferred fur-
ther action upon the case until the close of Minnesota's then
current legislative session. The court in Van DuSa'rtz again
stressed that absolute uniformity of school expenditures was
not required:
This Court in no way suggests to the Minnesota Legislature that it
adopt any one particular financing system. Rather, this memorandum
only recognizes a constitutional standard through which the Legisla-
ture may direct and measure its efforts. .3.
The only blemish thus far upon the adolescent face of the
Serrano court's thesis was rendered by the Supreme Court of
New York in the case of Spano v. Board of Education.40 Plain-
tiffs had brought suit alleging that New York's existing pro-
visions for levying and distributing school taxes were uncon-
stitutional based primarily upon the reasoning advanced in
Serrano. The court acknowledged that the existing financing
system may be inadequate and unfair,4 1 but that the pro-
nouncements of the United States Supreme Court in two pre-
vious cases 42 were controlling authority until otherwise pro-
claimed by that Court. Commenting specifically upon the
discussions of the Burruss and Mclnnis decisions by the
Serrano court, Justice Hawkins stated:
The majority's [Serrano] discussion of McInnis and Burruss, in my
opinion, is largelkr dicta and their extended comments gratuitous. In-
volving merely a motion to dismiss a complaint for general insuffi-
ciency, the latter portions of that decision, I believe, are speculations
and extrapolations as to what prompted the United States Supreme
Court twice -to affirm in such terse manner.43
39. Id. at 877,n.14.
40. 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S. 2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
41. Id. at 809, 328 N.Y.S. 2d at 234.
42. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd inm. sub
nor. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F.
Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
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In conclusion, the Spano court admonished that if the "one
scholar, one dollar" doctrine (a suggested variant of the "one
man, one vote" doctrine) is to become the law of the land, it is
the prerogative and within the "territorial imperative" of the




Although, as stated before, the principles relied upon by
the Serrano court were discussed in detail in the McInnis de-
cision and apparently rejected by the three-judge district
court, the summary affirmance of that decision 45 by the Su-
preme Court cannot conclusively foreclose the arguments pre-
sented in Serrano and those cases based upon it. A decentrali-
zation of powers is the primary consideration in allowing local
school districts to determine for themselves the quality of edu-
cation they desire in their schools. In this writer's opinion a
mandate of equal expenditures throughout a state would not
solve the problem of equal educational opportunity, and
Serrano and later cases defer to their respective legislatures
in the formulation of school financing plans. The right to at-
tend a public school is a fundamental right as is the right to
counsel in a criminal trial. However, every criminal defendant
is not entitled to the caliber of legal assistance that usually can
be attained only by the very wealthy.
The doctrine of "fiscal neutrality" which has emerged
from these decisions simply requires that the quality of edu-
cation may not be a function of wealth, other than the wealth
of the state as a whole.46 Certainly the educational system of
our nation is a fundamental function of local government;
according to one commentator, however, "No less can be said
about health services, police and fire services, water supply,
public housing, parks and recreation facilities, transportation,
welfare services, housing regulations and what have you."
'4 7
44. Id. at 810, 328 N.Y.S. 2d at 235.
45. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
46. Assuming the correctness of this doctrine, a question then remains as
to why the quality of education should be allowed to vary according to the
wealth of the various states throughout the nation.
47. Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional
Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHr. L. REv. 583, 589 (1968).
[Vol. 24
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In his dissent in Harper v. Virginia. Board of Elections,48
Justice Black stated:
The mere fact that a law results in treating some groups differently
from others does not, of course, automatically amount to a violation
of the equal protection clause. To ban a state from drawing any distinc-
tions in the application of its laws would practically paralyze the regula-
tory power of legislative bodies. 49
Rather than limiting this issue entirely to equal protection,
substantive due process may also be considered by the Su-
preme Court. Keeping this in mind, the statement made by
Justice Black in Adamson v. Californio50 may be appropriate:
The "natural law-due process formula" under which the courts make
the constitution mean what they think it should at a given time has
been used in the past, and can be used in the future, to license this
Court, in considering regulatory legislation, to roam at large in the
broad expanses of policy and morals, and to trespass, all too freely, on
the legislative domain of the states as well as the Federal Govern-
ment.51
The answer to the problem of equal educational oppor-
tunity is not one that lends itself to an easy or precise solu-
tion. In rendering a decision, the Supreme Court must con-
sider the tremendous impact upon our already faltering pub-
lic school system and the future implications of an affirmance
of Serrano-type reasoning. The most important question to be
answered by the Supreme Court is whether or not the classi-
fication of education as a fundamental interest in this con-
text is justified.
MICHAEL F. MULLINAX
48. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
49. Id. at 672.
50. 332 U.S. 49 (1947).
51. Id. at 90.
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